A Legacy of Leadership and a Future of Synergy in Anesthesia Care

This Week’s Spotlight: Dr. Jean Covillo, CRNA – Leading Excel Anesthesia Into a New Era of Synergy

This week, we shine the spotlight on Dr. Jean Covillo CRNA, founder and Managing Member of Excel Anesthesia. Her vision and leadership have guided the group from its pioneering start in 1996 to today’s exciting new era of partnership and synergy.

A Legacy of Leadership

In 1996, Dr. Covillo launched Excel Anesthesia with a bold mission: to showcase the strength, independence, and excellence of Certified Registered Nurse Anesthetists (CRNAs).

For nearly three decades, Excel operated as a 100% CRNA group, delivering safe, reliable, and cost-effective anesthesia services to outpatient and surgical facilities. Along the way, Dr. Covillo earned her Doctorate in Nurse Anesthesia Practice, further reinforcing her commitment to clinical excellence and leadership. Her dedication to quality care and operational efficiency built the strong reputation that continues to define Excel today.

Entering the Era of Synergy

While Excel’s CRNA foundation remains central, the group is now unveiling its signature Synergy Modeluniting CRNAs and anesthesiologists to deliver the most effective and financially sustainable care.

This new chapter brings in Dr. Alex Jurrens, who joins as both Medical Director and shareholder, alongside Chelsea Jurrens, CRNA. Together with longstanding partners Victor Quintero, CRNA, and Lexy DiMaggio, CRNA, they form a dynamic leadership team invested in Excel’s future.

Why This Matters

The Synergy Model ensures facilities receive the best of both worlds:

  • The proven value and efficiency of CRNAs
  • The complementary expertise and collaboration of anesthesiologists
  • A partnership structure that strengthens facility sustainability while prioritizing patient safety and clinical excellence
  • Optimized staffing reduces operating expense.  Synergy is flexible, scalable, and tailored to the number of rooms in operation

Looking Ahead

From its founding in 1996 to today’s strengthened leadership team, Excel Anesthesia’s story is one of innovation, resilience, and vision. With CRNAs and anesthesiologists working hand in hand under a unified partnership, Excel is ready to lead anesthesia care into its next era—one defined by synergy, excellence, and growth.

 

“No One Is Coming to Save Us” — But We’re Not Waiting Anymore

Opinion by: Jean Covillo, DNAP, CRNA

Randy Moore nailed it.

In his recent Substack article, “No One Is Coming to Save Us: The Anesthesia Strategy Crisis,” he lays bare what many of us have known for far too long but haven’t said out loud:
“We’ve all been played.”

While anesthesiologists and CRNAs duke it out in association echo chambers — AANA vs. ASA, scope vs. supervision, tribal posturing vs. political paralysis — commercial payers are sneaking up to wipe out reimbursement from the side- like coyotes circling distracted dogs.

This isn’t incompetence.
It’s calculated.

Divide-and-conquer isn’t just their strategy — it’s their business model.
And we’re being ambushed.


The Reality We’re Living

  • Premiums continue to rise.

  • Reimbursements continue to fall.

  • And it’s about to get worse.

The latest federal tax budget includes a projected 6% cut to Medicare payments.
And news flash: most commercially contracted anesthesia reimbursement rates are tied directly to Medicare — as a percentage.

So… what do you think is going to happen to your commercial rates?

United we stand. Divided, we’re priced out.

This isn’t a policy squabble.
It’s economic warfare — and we’re getting carpet bombed.

This Isn’t a Debate — It’s Survival

Anesthesiologists and CRNAs need to stop acting like rivals and start acting like allies.

We need a Unified Anesthesia Coalition with one objective: economic survival.

CRNAs. MDAs.
Practice owners. Legal experts. Policy strategists.
Working together. Right now.

The threat isn’t across the OR.
It’s across the negotiating table.


It Has to Start at Home

At Excel Anesthesia, We’re not waiting for a national fix.

Our initial efforts have focused on building the Synergy Model — a real-world, collaborative anesthesia delivery framework that’s lean, efficient, and fiercely protective of both patient access and provider sustainability.

This isn’t theory. It’s implementation.

We’ve built a structure where CRNAs and MDAs collaborate — not compete.
One that maximizes scheduling efficiency, removes redundant overhead, and ensures full OR coverage without burnout or bloat.

But let’s be honest:
Cost-effective anesthesia models don’t work if efficiency is penalized.

We’ve seen it: the more streamlined and responsible our delivery becomes, the more payers slash the rates.

We’ve done our part. Now it’s time to fight for its value.


The Failures That Got Us Here

We need to face the ugly truth: our leadership failed us.

  • ASA and AANA have produced zero cohesive strategy on reimbursement.

  • The No Surprises Act is a trap:
      • Its QPA (Qualified Payment Amount) rules artificially suppress CRNA-led reimbursements by creating “dual-provider” categories that distort market rates.
      • Its arbitration process is a delay mechanism — no timeline, no penalties, no accountability when payers ignore awards.

    • It fosters anti-competition and hinders cost-effective efforts.

  • Monopolistic insurers like BCBS exploit regional dominance with “take-it-or-leave-it” contracts that force full-network participation at unsustainable rates.

  • Medicare-indexed private contracts give commercial payers cover to mirror federal cuts without negotiation.

  • The outdated “supervision” policy pays less for team-based care — actively discouraging collaboration and cost-effective efforts.

  • CRNAs are singularly excluded from Locum Tenens rules — limiting flexibility, especially in small and rural practices.

This is not a comprehensive list. But it’s more than enough to prove the point.


Our Response: The 8-Pillar Strategy

This isn’t a manifesto. It’s a battle plan:

1. Provider Unity
• Build a joint CRNA–MDA task force of folks educated in reimbursement policy, focused solely on reimbursement and survival.

2. Coalition Building
• Form a broad-based coalition of stakeholders — hospitals, ASCs, national private groups, PE-backed groups, and small independents — aligned around one economic agenda: protecting value in anesthesia care.

3. Legal Strike
• File federal lawsuits to challenge discriminatory QPA calculations and anti-competitive contract language.

4. Regulatory Enforcement
• Enforce timely arbitration with automatic penalties for payer noncompliance.

5. Contract Reform
• End Medicare-indexed private payment models. Commercial rates should reflect regional market value — not federal austerity.

6. Monopoly Pressure
• File FTC and DOJ complaints against dominant insurers engaging in predatory, anti-competitive practices.

7. Medicare Policy Overhaul
• Challenge the flawed “supervision” penalty.
• Expand Locum Tenens eligibility to include CRNAs — to create equitable flexibility for all providers.

8. Legislative Firepower
• Draft and support state legislation to protect independent practices, mandate contract transparency, and hold payers accountable.

We’re Not Waiting Anymore

I’m with you, Randy.
I’m done watching our field cannibalize itself while insurers profit from our division.

We’ve got the model, we’ve got the message, and now we need the movement.

Let’s stop playing defense.
Let’s unify.
Let’s fight back.


Click Here to see our Synergy Model in action!

Behind the Curtain: The One Big Beautiful Bill’s Hidden Blow to Anesthesia Providers in Kansas City

Written by Dr. Jean Covillo, CRNA

Here is the fine print that no one wants to talk about.

Tucked deep within the folds of the One Big Beautiful Bill Act (OBBBA), is a sleight-of-hand move anesthesia providers cannot afford to ignore. The bill, if passed, would indirectly trigger an automatic 4% Medicare cut under PAYGO—on top of the existing 2% reduction—and drag down commercial rates such as those from BCBSKC, which are tied to Medicare. By 2030, anesthesia Medicare rates are estimated at $16.50 per unit, with similarly steep cuts projected for BCBSKC.¹⁻²

Cloaked in polished language that promises significant tax cuts to everyday citizens, the OBBBA quietly dismantles payment structures, shifts burdens, and pushes anesthesia providers to the brink. In Kansas City, where surgical access depends on viable anesthesia care, this is more than policy—it is a vanishing act that could leave CRNAs and anesthesiologists holding an empty top hat.

It is a fiscal trapdoor beneath already collapsing reimbursement floors—one that compounds cuts into a perfect storm of financial pressure, leading to steep salary reductions, loss of business, and reduced access to care.³

1. Immediate Cuts: The 2025 Baseline

Anesthesia providers in Kansas City face a 2.2–2.3% Medicare rate reduction in 2025:
– Non-facility rate: Decreases from $20.61 (2024) to $20.13/unit
– Facility rate: Falls from $19.56 to $19.12/unit

This marks the fifth consecutive year of Medicare cuts, with cumulative reductions exceeding 10% since 2020.¹

2. OBBBA’s Compounding Impact (2026–2034)

The bill’s $3.3 trillion deficit would trigger automatic 4% annual Medicare cuts under statutory PAYGO (S-PAYGO) rules, layering atop baseline reductions.²

Projected Rate Trajectory for Kansas City Anesthesia (Non-Facility):

Year    Rate/Unit    Cumulative Reduction    Drivers
2025    $20.13        2.2%                   CMS policy
2026    $19.32        6.4%                   +4% S-PAYGO
2027    $18.55        ~10.6%                 +2–3% baseline +4% S-PAYGO
2030    ~$16.50       ~20%                   Compounded cuts

Key implications:
– By 2030, reimbursement would fall below 2008 levels, adjusted for inflation.³
– A typical 10-unit case would yield $36 less revenue than in 2024.³⁻⁴

3. Commercial Payer Domino Effect

Insurers like BCBSKC, which pay 150–250% of Medicare rates, would mirror these reductions:⁴
– 2025 BCBSKC rate: $30.20–$50.33/unit
– 2026 BCBSKC rate: $29.00–$48.31/unit
– Estimated revenue loss: $13,000–$23,000 annually per physician due to combined Medicare and BCBSKC cuts.⁴⁻⁵

4. Systemic Risks

Threat              Magnitude
Rural access collapse 40% of Missouri’s rural anesthesia providers at risk of closure⁵
Provider attrition 15% of Kansas City–area anesthesiologists may reduce Medicare volume⁶
Surgery delays Projected 8–12% increase in wait times for elective procedures⁶

5. Legislative Crossroads

– H.R. 10073 (Medicare Patient Access and Practice Stabilization Act of 2024) would reverse the 2025 cuts but cannot block OBBBA-triggered S-PAYGO reductions.⁶
– OBBBA amendments: Only deficit reduction or an S-PAYGO waiver would prevent the 4% annual cuts.²

Conclusion: A Perfect Storm

The OBBBA would transform existing Medicare cuts into a prolonged financial crisis for Kansas City anesthesia providers:

1. Short term: 2.2% cut in 2025 strains practices already battling inflation.¹
2. Medium term: 4% annual cuts beginning in 2026 compound the damage.²
3. Existential threat: By 2030, rates could fall 20% below 2025 levels, risking mass provider exits and reduced surgical access.³

Urgent Priorities:
– Block OBBBA’s deficit expansion.
– Pass H.R. 10073 for immediate relief.
– Decouple commercial payments from Medicare benchmarks.⁷

References

  1. Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services. CY 2025 Medicare Physician Fee Schedule Final Rule. 2024.
  2. Congressional Budget Office. Cost Estimate for the “One Big Beautiful Bill Act.” 2025.
  3. American Society of Anesthesiologists. Anesthesia Payment Trends Analysis 2020–2025. 2024.
  4. Blue Cross Blue Shield of Kansas City. Provider Reimbursement Guidelines. 2025.
  5. Missouri Hospital Association. Rural Anesthesia Access Report. 2025.
  6. S. Congress. H.R. 10073: Medicare Patient Access and Stabilization Act. 2025.
  7. Health Affairs. Commercial Payer Payment Linkage to Medicare. 2024.
  8. S. Government Accountability Office. Medicare Payment Cuts and Provider Viability. 2025.

Anesthesia Groups are “Singing the Blues.” The Transparency Crisis and Market Dominance of BCBSKC and Anthem

Commercial Contracting for Anesthesia Services: How the No Surprises Act Favors Major Insurers

By Jean Covillo, DNAP,CRNA
Managing Partner, Excel Anesthesia, LLC

Anesthesia groups are at the mercy of insurance monopolies like BCBSKC, where even a $5 rate change per unit can mean survival or collapse—and a $10 cut is devastating

The No Surprises Act (NSA), enacted in January 2022 to shield patients from unexpected medical bills, has inadvertently tilted the balance of power toward dominant insurers like Blue Cross Blue Shield of Kansas City (BCBSKC) and Anthem, leaving healthcare providers—particularly anesthesia groups—in a precarious position. By prohibiting balance billing for out-of-network care at in-network facilities, the NSA traps anesthesia providers in a financial Catch-22: accept insurers’ below-market rates or bill out-of-network and face reimbursement capped at the insurer-calculated Qualifying Payment Amount (QPA), which often falls far below fair market value. In markets like Kansas City, where BCBSKC commands a 52% commercial insurance monopoly,[1] even minor rate adjustments (e.g., $5–$10 per anesthesia unit) can determine whether a practice survives or collapses.

While BCBSKC has raised premiums by up to 25% for Kansas and Missouri employers since 2021,[2] it has simultaneously slashed reimbursement rates for anesthesia services, leveraging the NSA’s independent dispute resolution, (IDR) process to delay payments and exploit systemic opacity. Federal data shows arbitrators side with providers in 80% of disputes,[3] yet insurers routinely ignore awards, knowing small practices lack resources to enforce them. For anesthesia groups, this translates to revenue losses of 20–30%, threatening rural and urban hospital staffing and patient access. Without urgent reforms to restore transparency and fairness, the NSA risks entrenching insurer monopolies and eroding the viability of independent practices in all settings.

Why It Matters To Anesthesia Groups

The Inescapable Network Lock-in

BCBS companies maintain dominant market positions across most U.S. states, with BCBSKC holding a commanding 52% share in Kansas City and Anthem controlling the largest market share in 80 metropolitan areas nationwide.[2] In Missouri specifically, Elevance Health (Anthem) holds a 29% market share as the state’s largest commercial insurer. This market concentration means that dropping contracts with either insurer forces most commercial claims out-of-network—creating a logistical and financial crisis for providers.

The Hidden Problem: Lack of Transparency in Health Insurance

Transparency in health insurance remains one of the biggest frustrations for providers—especially when it comes to reimbursement from dominant insurers like BCBSKC and Anthem. Across the industry, the same question keeps coming up: How can you renegotiate a contract when you don’t know which plan paid what?

The Anesthesia-Specific Impact

You try to pull a report to analyze historical payments by plan, only to discover that none of the claims list the actual plan ID. There’s no way to tell if you were reimbursed according to the proper contracted rate—or even which product line the payment applied to. You call your provider rep for help. They can’t tell you either. So without this information, you are flying blind.

  • You can’t negotiate or track underpayments without plan-level data
  • You can’t analyze which contracts are profitable—or harmful
  • You can’t appeal claims effectively without knowing which fee schedule was applied
  • Insurers can hide low-paying products in blended contracts, draining your revenue

Let’s be real: what other business relationship allows payments to be made without a way to audit for accuracy?

This opacity is particularly problematic with large, complex insurers like BCBSKC and Anthem, which offer hundreds of different products across multiple market segments. BCBSKC alone manages commercial plans, ACA marketplace plans, Medicare supplements, and previously managed Medicare Advantage plans across their 30-county service area. Anthem’s portfolio is even more complex, spanning 80 metropolitan areas with varying product lines, networks, and reimbursement schedules.

Many large plans have ceased considering rate increases entirely, with their published fee schedules becoming non-negotiable. The No Surprises Act has amplified this problem by providing insurers with additional leverage through the IDR process, which they exploit to delay payments and suppress reimbursements.[2]

Why Is Plan Identification So Opaque?

Because it Benefits the Insurers. 

Insurers gain by keeping things opaque. It limits providers’ ability to compare rates, identify underpayments, and negotiate fairly. Many refuse to disclose contract-level mapping under the guise of “proprietary information.” Recent lawsuits against BCBS companies allege that this opacity is part of systematic anticompetitive practices designed to “artificially suppress reimbursement rates for providers.”

Lack of Regulatory Mandates

No federal or state law currently requires insurers like BCBSKC or Anthem to list a specific product or contract ID on claims or remittances. The No Surprises Act and price transparency rules fall short—they don’t mandate disclosure of contract details per claim. While the Transparency in Coverage final rule requires plans to disclose negotiated rates publicly, these machine-readable files don’t help providers identify what actually paid their specific claims.

Legacy System Design and Market Fragmentation

BCBS operates as a federation of independent licensees, each with separate contracts and products. BCBSKC’s credentialing and contracting processes demonstrate this complexity, with providers required to navigate multiple network participation requirements, tax ID configurations, and service location specifications. Their three-character prefix system is for claim routing—not contract transparency.

Post-NSA, providers are now forced to contract with more plans under consolidated agreements.[1] Many carriers like Anthem require “all-plan participation,” forcing providers to accept below-market plans bundled with stronger ones.[1] This bundling obscures which specific products are generating revenue or losses for provider practices.[1]

Complex, Overlapping Plan Structures

BCBSKC and Anthem offer hundreds of products: PPOs, HMOs, EPOs, ASOs, ACA plans, Medicare Advantage, and more. Many are self-funded, with employers paying claims and insurers merely administering—making contract visibility even murkier. BCBSKC’s service across 30 counties with varying network configurations creates additional complexity layers that benefit the insurer in contract negotiations.

What Should Be Required?

At minimum, every EOB or remittance from insurers like BCBSKC and Anthem should list:

  • The specific product name (e.g., “Blue KC PPO Bronze 2025” or “Anthem HMO Select Missouri”)
  • The contract ID or fee schedule used to price the claim
  • The group number and network status
  • The QPA (if applicable) and how it was calculated

This would let providers:

  • Audit payments accurately
  • Identify and challenge underpayments
  • Make informed contracting decisions
  • Understand where revenue is really coming from

Kansas has taken a pioneering step in this direction with legislation requiring “Real Time Explanation of Benefits,” mandating that insurance companies provide electronic access to patient cost estimates using standardized transaction sets.

The Monopoly: BCBSKC and Anthem’s Stranglehold

BCBSKC’s Regional Monopolistic Position

Blue Cross Blue Shield of Kansas City wields extraordinary market power across the Kansas City metropolitan area, serving approximately one million members across 30 counties in greater Kansas City and northwest Missouri, plus Johnson and Wyandotte counties in Kansas. The company holds a commanding 52% market share in the Kansas City metro area, making it virtually impossible for anesthesia providers to operate without their contracts.[1] As the largest not-for-profit health insurer in Missouri, BCBSKC’s dominance extends beyond simple market share—it represents an essential gatekeeper for provider revenue streams.

This market concentration becomes even more pronounced when examining specific metropolitan areas within their service territory.[2] In Lawrence, Kansas, BCBS holds 51% market share, while in Manhattan it controls an overwhelming 74% of the market.[2] Topeka shows even more extreme concentration at 72% market share.[2] These statistics reveal that dropping BCBSKC contracts essentially forces providers into financial suicide, as the vast majority of commercially insured patients would become out-of-network.[2]

Anthem’s National and Regional Domination

Anthem (now Elevance Health) represents an even larger threat to provider autonomy, operating as the second-largest health insurer nationally with 44.3 million members. More significantly for contract negotiations, Anthem holds the largest market share in 80 metropolitan statistical areas across the United States—more than any other insurer. This geographical dominance provides Anthem with unparalleled leverage in provider contract negotiations.

In Missouri specifically, Elevance Health (formerly Anthem) maintains a 29% market share, making it the state’s largest commercial insurer. Nationally, while Anthem’s market share dropped slightly from 13% in 2014 to 12% in 2020, the company has strategically strengthened its position through government program growth. Between 2011 and 2021, Anthem’s Medicaid enrollment exploded from 1.8 million to 9.8 million members, demonstrating how the company has leveraged taxpayer-funded programs for spectacular growth.

The company’s dominance becomes even more concerning when examining market concentration data. Analysis of potential merger scenarios shows that in markets like Missouri, Anthem’s existing high market shares create anti-competitive environments that would be “presumed likely to enhance market power” under federal antitrust guidelines. In the Kansas City metropolitan area specifically, any additional market consolidation involving Anthem would raise significant competitive concerns.

How the No Surprises Act Amplifies Insurer Leverage Against Providers

The IDR System: Designed to Favor Big Blues

The Independent Dispute Resolution (IDR) process established by the No Surprises Act has become a weapon for large insurers like BCBSKC and Anthem rather than the fair arbitration system Congress intended. Federal agencies estimated that only 17,000 claims would go through the IDR process annually, but between April 2022 and March 2023, a staggering 334,828 disputes were initiated—nearly fourteen times the original estimate.

While federal arbitrators sided with anesthesiologists and other providers in over 80% of cases during 2024, demonstrating that provider payment requests are reasonable, insurers have learned to game the system through delays and procedural manipulation.[3] The American Society of Anesthesiologists reports that “insurers are using the No Surprises Act to hide from and delay paying for anesthesia services,” effectively forcing providers to float revenue while lengthy disputes play out.[3]

The QPA Weapon: Artificially Suppressing Payments

The Qualified Payment Amount (QPA), ostensibly designed as a fair baseline for arbitration, has become a tool for systematic underpayment. BCBSKC’s own guidance reveals how the QPA is “derived from the plan’s median contracted rate for a particular service” and represents “the amount Blue KC has made the allowable for the non-participating provider’s payment on the claim.” However, the AMA and American Hospital Association have sued the federal government, arguing that the final rule “overemphasizes the QPA in ways that favor insurers.”

This QPA manipulation allows insurers like BCBSKC and Anthem to systematically underpay providers while maintaining plausible deniability. Since “insurers know they can obtain payment rates through IDR arbitration near the below-market QPA,” they have little incentive to negotiate fair contracts. The result is a race to the bottom in provider reimbursement, with the No Surprises Act providing legal cover for this systematic underpayment.

Market Concentration: The Numbers Don’t Lie

Current market analysis reveals the true scope of insurer dominance that enables this systematic exploitation. According to the American Medical Association’s 2023 Competition in Health Insurance study, 73% of metropolitan statistical area-level commercial markets are highly concentrated, with 48% of markets having a single insurer controlling at least 50% of market share.

This concentration has worsened since the No Surprises Act’s implementation. From 2014 to 2022, the share of highly concentrated commercial markets rose from 71% to 73%. More troubling, 53% of markets that were highly concentrated in 2014 became even more concentrated, while 29% of previously competitive markets crossed the threshold into high concentration.

For anesthesia providers, this concentration creates an impossible negotiating environment. When a single insurer like BCBSKC controls 52% of the Kansas City market, or when Anthem dominates 80 metropolitan areas nationally, providers face a stark choice: accept below-market rates or lose access to the majority of their potential patient base.

What’s Being Done?

Regulatory Push

CMS has taken some steps through machine-readable in-network rate files and transparency requirements, but these don’t help providers identify what actually paid their claims. The Transparency in Coverage final rule requires disclosure of negotiated rates but falls short of providing claim-level transparency needed to audit payments from complex insurers like BCBSKC and Anthem.

Provider Advocacy Against Market Concentration

Medical societies and hospital associations are fighting for more transparency and challenging the systematic underpayment enabled by market concentration. The AMA has adopted policies supporting greater health care transparency and has outlined eight specific ways to improve price transparency, including requiring health plans to provide complete, real-time cost-sharing information. The AMA has also advocated for fairness in No Surprises Act implementation, challenging administration rules that favor insurers over providers.

Recent antitrust lawsuits against BCBS companies, including dozens of health systems and physician groups filing new cases following a $2.8 billion settlement in 2024, highlight provider frustration with systematic underpayment. These lawsuits challenge “longstanding market practices and their impact on provider reimbursements,” specifically targeting market concentration that enables contract manipulation.

State-Level Action

Some states are considering or have passed legislation requiring more detailed EOBs, but adoption and enforcement vary significantly when facing opposition from dominant insurers. Missouri has proposed transparency legislation that would establish criteria for health care quality and cost-efficiency data disclosure. However, most states still lack explicit requirements for EOB content, despite the near-universal use of these forms.

What Can You Do Now?

  • Document and Escalate: Keep records of every instance where plan info is missing—use them in negotiations with BCBSKC and Anthem representatives
  • Demand Disclosure: When signing or renewing contracts, require insurers to include product names and contract IDs on all remits
  • Engage with Advocacy Groups: Support state and national lobbying efforts pushing for transparency reform and challenging market concentration

For anesthesia providers specifically, experts recommend working closely with surgical partners to align anesthesia services with pre-authorized surgical procedures and creating pricing estimates for patients.[1] However, these strategies provide limited protection against the systematic underpayment enabled by market concentration.[2]

Bottom Line

It is not acceptable for insurers like BCBSKC and Anthem to obscure which plan or contract is being used to pay a claim, particularly given their overwhelming market dominance. When BCBSKC controls 52% of the Kansas City market and Anthem dominates 80 metropolitan areas nationally, this lack of transparency becomes a weapon against fair competition.[2]

This lack of transparency:

  • Harms providers by preventing accurate payment auditing
  • Undermines fair contracting by eliminating negotiation leverage
  • Obstructs informed, efficient care delivery
  • Enables systematic underpayment through market manipulation

The No Surprises Act, while protecting patients, has inadvertently strengthened the positions of dominant insurers like BCBSKC and Anthem in contract negotiations.[2] These companies now use the IDR process to delay payments, exploit the QPA calculation to suppress reimbursements, and leverage their market dominance to force providers into accepting below-market contracts.[2]

The only way this changes is through continued pressure—provider advocacy, regulatory reform, antitrust enforcement, and contract-level demands for accountability. With market concentration reaching crisis levels and the No Surprises Act being weaponized against providers, transparency reforms are more critical than ever for provider financial viability and patient access to care.[2]

References

  1. Blue KC to Exit Medicare Advantage Market in 2025
  2. Medical Kansas Rate Increase | Blue KC
  3. Medical Front-Liners Report Ongoing Insurer Abuse – PR Newswire
  4. Why Rural Hospitals Across America Are at Risk of Closure
  5. Anesthesia Workforce Shortage Poses Threat to Health Care
  6. Blue KC Platform Case Study
  7. BCBSKC Annual Report, 2023
  8. BCBS Kansas City Exiting Medicare Advantage Market
  9. Blue KC Press Release, 2025
  10. Top 5 Largest Health Insurers in the US

An Evaluation of Commercial Payer Reimbursement and Contracting Factors for Physician Anesthesiologists and Certified Registered Nurse Anesthetists for Services Performed in 2019

CRNA Reimbursement. Making a Case for Parity.

By Jean Covillo, DNAP, MA, CRNA, APRN

Physician Anesthesiologists (ANs) and Certified Registered Nurse Anesthetists (CRNAs) are qualified and licensed to provide anesthesia services. CMS directly reimburses both providers precisely the same, simply because it recognizes that both providers perform the same service, with the same patient safety outcomes, while adhering to the same quality performance standards. Reimbursement parity has already been established in law as clearly defined in the provider nondiscrimination section of the Affordable Care Act (ACA).

Why, then, are commercial payers (Payers) reimbursing CRNAs significantly less for the same service? The reason is obvious….. because they can. Payers are too rich, too powerful, and too influential to be held accountable by the “little folk.” The case for CRNA reimbursement parity is clear and convincing, as outlined in the article below. Although winning the argument and affecting real change might seem as challenging as David vs. Goliath, gaining support from Hospital C-Suite executives who can appreciate the financial benefits, might be all that is needed to tip the scales.

Takeaways:

  • CMS has set the value for the anesthesia procedures and reimburses only those providers “qualified” to perform them. CMS has deemed CRNAs “qualified” as long as the procedure is within the CRNA state scope of practice. Reimbursement parity between the two provider categories is recognized and established by Medicare Part B in reimbursement rules and regulations.
  • CRNAs are the only nursing specialty authorized by Medicare Part B to receive direct reimbursement at 100% of the physician fee schedule, while all other nursing specialties receive a lesser percentage.
  • CRNAs are not physician extenders and are not dependent on ANs to provide the service.  Both providers deliver the same service with the same patient safety outcomes, and both deliver this service according to the same quality and performance measures and standards.
  • Fee Valuation-Resourced Based Relative Value Scale (RBRVS). All physician fees (with the exception of ANs)  are valued according to the RBRVS -where the “cost of educational training” is one of three factors contributing to the underlying fee. In contrast, anesthesia fees are based on the “complexity” of each procedure with value added for actual time spent providing the service.   Educational costs and training expenses were not factored into the underlying AN fee calculations.  This method is unique to ANs and CRNAs. Given that both CRNAs and ANs  provide the same services for the exact same procedures, and educational expense was never factored into the fee valuation, it follows that educational expense  simply cannot serve as a basis to rationalize reimbursement disparities when the “deliverable” remains  the same.
  • When Payers discriminately lower CRNA rates, they effectively sabotage hospital cost-saving efforts by keeping a portion of the CRNA fee for themselves. Conversely, when Payers are held accountable to nondiscrimination laws, reimbursement is equitable among providers.  Revenues are passed to hospitals and businesses where they belong; serving to offset operating expense and eliminate the need for hospital subsidies.
  • The simplest argument to be made is that the law requires it to be so. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act. 42 U.S. Code § 300gg–5 – Nondiscrimination in health care.6

a)Providers  – A group health plan and a health insurance issuer offering group or individual health insurance coverage shall not discriminate with respect to participation under the plan or coverage against any health care provider who is acting within the scope of that provider’s license or certification under applicable State law. This section shall not require that a group health plan or health insurance issuer contract with any health care provider willing to abide by the terms and conditions for participation established by the plan or issuer. Nothing in this section shall be construed as preventing a group health plan, a health insurance issuer, or the Secretary from establishing varying reimbursement rates based on quality or performance measures.

The case for parity begins by reviewing important background information relevant to the argument: the historical significance behind the Medicare decision to accord CRNAs direct billing rights and a brief review of the mechanisms associated with billing under the four anesthesia delivery models. The case will follow with a reliance on facts showing clear and compelling arguments in favor of legislatively mandated reimbursement parity, the economic consequences when ongoing disparities exist, and the importance of holding commercial insurance companies accountable to parity policies.

Background

CRNAs were the first nursing specialty to be accorded the right to bill Medicare Part B for services through the Omnibus Reconciliation Act of 1986 (OBRA), becoming effective in 1989 when payment rules and regulations were established. CRNAs are the only nursing specialty authorized by Medicare Part B to receive direct reimbursement at 100% of the physician fee schedule, while all other nursing specialties receive a lesser percentage.1 When CRNAs provide nonmedically directed anesthesia services, under the QZ modifier code, Medicare reimburses at the same rate as physicians.2-4

The reason for the government’s decision to recognize parity is likely due to the conclusion that CRNAs were not “physician extenders,” as stated by the Physician Payment Review Commission (PPRC) in the Annual report to Congress in 1989.The PPRC report describes CRNAs as

“distinctly unique compared to other Nonphysician Practitioners (NPP) in that they (CRNAs) were not considered “physician extenders.”

The report states in part,

“CRNAs began administering anesthesia in the mid-nineteenth century and, in doing so, became the first nurse specialists. Their early role was not as physician extenders, but rather as primary providers of anesthesia.” 5 pg. 185 

The PPRC report spoke directly to parity in payment between the two provider categories, clarifying the intentions behind the decision.

“Beginning in 1991 and extending through the transition to the full Medicare Fee Schedule in 1996, the nonmedically directed CRNA conversion factor will gradually increase until it is equal to the physician conversion factor.  This places the nonmedically directed CRNA on parity with physicians and provides a differential payment to medically directed CRNAs.(5 pg. 194)

Although Medicare authorized CRNA reimbursement at the same rate as physicians, Payers have been reticent to do so. Payers regularly update reimbursement policies within days of Medicare changes to mirror these policies. Still, many ignore payment parity, probably because there has never been any recourse or consequence. Some Payers continue to apply negative payment adjustments to the CRNA rates, while others exclude reimbursement for some procedures. Some commercial and state Medicaid plans do not recognize the CRNA as eligible for reimbursement for specific procedures under the QZ modifier even though the CRNA is authorized through their scope of practice and state licensure to provide these services. To participate in commercial plans, CRNAs often must accept reduced payments and occasional denials, resulting in a lower percentage of the prevailing physician rates and, in some instances, receiving no payment.

These practices and policies contradict existing laws in the provider nondiscrimination section of the affordable care act (ACA).6 Payer reductions in CRNA reimbursement based purely on licensure rather than performance and quality disincentivize cost-effective strategies and unfairly disadvantage the CRNA from freely competing in the market. As it stands, Payers, rather than hospitals and anesthesia businesses, are benefitting from the “cost savings” when CRNAs provide the same services as provided by more costly AN medical direction models. Although patients continue to receive the same quality anesthesia service when CRNAs provide the service, the Payer directly benefits from the savings generated by compensating CRNA about a third less than an AN. When Payers can discriminately reimburse two separate providers even while both deliver the same service, hospitals or groups have no incentive to hire less costly CRNAs. Although increasing the CRNA utilization dramatically lowers operating expense, the  reduction in reimbursement offsets the effort. But when Payers are held accountable to nondiscrimination laws, the savings are passed to hospitals and businesses where they belong; serving to offset operating expense and eliminate the need for hospital subsidies. Consequently, these businesses are incentivized to utilize more cost-efficient anesthesia delivery models comprised of higher numbers of CRNAs and less costly ANs resulting in lower overall healthcare costs.

Anesthesia Delivery Models and the QZ Modifier

Anesthesia reimbursement is calculated differently from all other physician procedures. Each procedure is assigned a base unit value. The “procedural complexity determines the number of base units”; the more complex the procedure, the higher the base units. Each 15-minute interval is equal to one time unit. Modifier units can add more units to the procedure, i.e., hypotensive technique, etc., as the procedure gains complexity beyond the existing base units.  Reimbursement is calculated by taking the base units  + modifier units + time units to get the total billable units.  Total billable units are multiplied by a conversion factor  (CF) to complete the billable charge.  The conversion factor is the rate or dollar amount assigned to 1 unit of work.   Medicare sets the value for the CF annually, and both CRNAs and ANs are reimbursed the same according to this “set” rate.  But this doesn’t hold with Payers.  Payers negotiate the rate (CF) separately with each contracting provider or group. Confidentiality and nondisclosure language in these commercial contracts prevent providers from sharing their contracted rates.  Consequently, providers are hard-pressed to know the prevailing rates in the area or what the market will bear.

Anesthesia services are provided through one of the four delivery models:7 Physician “personally performed,” CRNA “personally performed” without medical direction by a physician (QZ), “Medical Direction,” and “Medical Supervision.”Two of these delivery models involve anesthesia delivery by a solo provider, AN, or CRNA.  In the “personally performed” delivery model, reimbursement is fully allocated to the service provider.  In other words, the provider is given the whole pie. When CRNAs provide anesthesia service alone, the QZ modifier code is used on the billing claim to signify the CRNA administered the services without medical direction from an AN.  The two remaining anesthesia delivery models effectively increase non-reimbursed expenses through the added overhead costs of another provider, supervising or directing the anesthesia delivery without any corresponding offset in reimbursement. When ANs “medically direct” or “supervise,” separate provider modifier codes are placed on the claim identifying the conditions in which the anesthetic is being delivered.  A properly submitted claim will show each of the provider’s codes.   The combination of codes used represents the anesthesia delivery model.   For example, the code QK/QX would signify a medically directed model, and payment would be conditioned on the AN performing all seven TEFRA steps (see table below for TEFRA steps).

Modifiers signify the provider type (physician or CRNA) and the delivery model. There are other modifiers, but these will be the only ones addressed for the discussion. The following table summarizes the modifiers, the conditions for payment assigned to each delivery model, and the percentage of the payment (or pie) each provider receives for the procedure charge.

Modifier Codes and Anesthesia Delivery Models7,8

Medicare Claims Processing Manual Chapter 12 – Physicians/Nonphysician Practitioners, see Section 50 for AN Services and 140 for CRNA Services

It is important to note that in most cases, only one payment is allowed per procedure regardless of delivery model or AN involvement.  In other words, there is only one pie.  “Medical direction” and “medical supervision” increase the number of providers billing for the same procedure, effectively forcing the pie to be shared between the two providers.  Though the billable charge remains the same, the anesthesia delivery model reallocates the payment between both providers.  In other words, the whole pie offered as payment to the solo providers is now split between the two.  The CRNA is always reimbursed for half the units delivered when not working alone, but the AN portion depends on meeting the conditions defined in the anesthesia delivery model. The medical direction model lists 7 steps that must be completed for the AN to meet the conditions for payment.

When ANs cannot perform these 7 steps, conditions are not met for medical direction, and the model defaults to medical supervision (unless the AN decides to bill the claim as QZ).  The medical supervision model results in pieces of the pie being left on the table and less payment than if the CRNA had performed the procedure alone.  In this instance, not only is the pie divided but parts of it are being left behind.  Under the “failed” medical direction model, the model defaults to “medical supervision,” and payment is nearly cut in half; 50%  CRNA and 3-4 units for the ANs. This is definitely not cost-efficient.  Consequently, ANs provide a “workaround” when failing to meet the conditions of medical direction by submitting the claim under the QZ  modifier as a means to recoup the lost units instead of accepting the alternative of losing units under “medical supervision.”9 In this manner, the claim is reimbursed at 100% since the portion assigned to the CRNA increases.  Since the physician wasn’t able to meet the conditions, coding the claim as QZ  could be considered technically accurate, but using this code for this type of “workaround” renders any kind of reporting related to the QZ modifier useless since an AN was onsite at the location.  As it stands, it is impossible to ascertain how many CRNAs are truly providing QZ services without an AN onsite, what geographical location QZ services are provided, and in which settings these services are administered, i.e., hospitals, surgery centers, clinics, etc.

Valuation

The higher cost of education received by physicians as compared to CRNAs has formed the basis for arguments by physicians and insurance Payers that rationalize disparities in reimbursement rates. These arguments would have merit if the educational costs were included in the original methods of fee valuation. While all other physician specialties included the educational expense as one of the three components contributing to their valuation,10,11 ANs did not. Instead, ANs valued the service by the total number of billable units derived from the procedure, where total units equal the sum of procedural base units, modifier units, and time units. The reimbursement amount is then calculated by multiplying the total units by a conversion factor (rate in dollars) which CMS determines. Base units merely reflect “procedural complexity” and do not consider operating costs such as overhead or education.

Given that both CRNAs and ANs are licensed and qualified to provide the same anesthesia services for the exact same procedures, and educational expense was never factored into the valuation of the fee, it follows that these arguments simply cannot serve as a basis to rationalize reimbursement disparities when the “deliverable” is the same.

Quality and Safety

Finally, arguments suggesting differences in “quality and safety” as the reasons for higher physician payments have been shown to be without merit. Multiple research studies have failed to demonstrate a difference in safety between the two groups.12-17 In a recent study conducted by Negrusa in 2016,15, more than 5.7 million anesthesia claims were identified from a 2011-2012 large commercial database. These claims were analyzed for differences in patient safety outcomes between the anesthesia delivery models.   The results suggest that there is strong evidence of differences in the likelihood of anesthesia complications by patient characteristics, patient co-morbidities, and the procedures being administered, but virtually no evidence that the odds of a complication differ by the scope of practice or delivery model.

Reimbursement Parity Vs. Cost-Effective Strategies

Parity in reimbursement means reimbursing CRNAs at the same rate/unit as their physician counterparts when providing the same service.  Medicare has fixed rates that effectively establish parity between the provider categories; both are reimbursed through the same conversion factor.   Payers negotiate these rates with each contracting group of providers.  CRNA groups that don’t include physicians under the contracting roster are reported to receive a much lower rate from these Payers than physician counterparts.  Oftentimes Payers negotiate CRNAs rates based on a percentage of the physician rates.  CRNAs who wish to participate in the plan are forced to accept these lower rates or risk even lower out-of-network payments.

CRNAs that argue against parity do so out of concern that parity demands could be misconstrued as a “not so subtle” CRNA campaign to increase salaries. While others rely on the flawed premise that cost-effectiveness cannot be attained when reimbursement is the same.  Reimbursement and cost-effective strategies are not synonymous, nor are they similar terms (other than both relating to money). Cost-effective strategies do not relate to the “fixed cost” of an item. In this case, the “fixed cost of reimbursement” refers only to the cost of the anesthesia procedure and does not contemplate additional expenses arising from the service itself, i.e., number of providers needed per case, call services, and time otherwise spent between cases, all of which add to the underlying operating expense.

CRNAs are more cost-effective simply because the non-reimbursed operating expense associated with the “CRNA-only” delivery model is significantly less than other models that require redundant staffing, or sharing the “pie” between two equally qualified providers18-24.  In addition, the CRNA’s salary is less than half that of an AN, which further reduces operating costs and contributes to a much more cost-efficient service. Even though reimbursement is fixed, profitability is translated directly to hospitals and surgery centers through lower operating costs and contracts free from stipends or guarantees. When reimbursement parity exists, the reimbursement amount is sufficient to offset these costs.  Without it, hospitals are left to make up the difference which unfairly disadvantages the CRNA in the competitive market.

CRNAs serving hospitals and surgery centers across the country must negotiate with commercial insurance Payers for their reimbursements. Many of these nurse anesthetists report an inability to negotiate rates equivalent to their AN counterparts. In addition to lower rates, Payers are refusing to reimburse CRNAs for procedures they are qualified to perform. This form of payment discrimination obstructs free and fair competition within the market. In the presence of reimbursement parity, operating expenses associated with the actual cost of providing anesthesia services (24-hour call and downtime between cases) could be fully offset through the QZ delivery model.

Summary/Conclusion

True reimbursement parity is blind to the credentials of the anesthesia provider. An equitable payment model enables CRNA services to become self-sustaining and competitive as a cost-effective solution in today’s healthcare market. Long-term reductions in healthcare costs can be sustained when the business entity (hospital or group) has the power to control and implement changes that directly translate to cost-saving benefits for themselves without altering the quality and safety of the service provided. Cost-effective strategies only work when companies are incentivized to improve profitability by initiating changes to staffing models that result in reduced operating expenses without offsetting revenue loss.

The passage of the ACA has resulted in the increased cost of medical and preventive health services to more than 30 million additional people.  For a country recovering from a national pandemic and arguably the highest health care costs in the world, it is essential to recognize the economic value CRNA-directed care brings to hospitals struggling to stay afloat.

The ACA requires Payers to reimburse providers non-discriminately regardless of licensure when performing the same service. The intent of this Act was to challenge the system to improve processes designed to reduce overhead and increase productivity without any loss in revenue. Hospitals have risen to the challenge with “efficiency-driven anesthesia models” where higher numbers of CRNAs can more flexibly provide the same services while decreasing overhead expenses.  This can only be achieved through reimbursement parity and ensuring Payer policies provide equitable opportunities among providers.

But when Payers discriminately lower CRNA rates, they effectively sabotage these cost-saving efforts by earmarking a portion of the CRNA fee as “profitable savings” for themselves.The ACA wasn’t intended to serve as a profitable windfall for Payers or prevent CRNAs from freely competing in the market. Currently, there are no regulations to enforce Payer compliance with nondiscrimination provisions. Instead, Payers are “trusted to use good faith efforts when interpreting the law” which has left many hospitals holding the bag- necessitating anesthesia subsidies to offset revenue loss.

Simply put, when Payers are held accountable to nondiscrimination laws, the savings are passed to hospitals and businesses where they belong. Consequently, these businesses are incentivized to utilize more cost-efficient anesthesia delivery models comprised of higher numbers of CRNAs and less costly ANs which ultimately lowers healthcare costs, reduces/eliminates subsidy requirements, and improves the overall healthcare economy.

 

References

  1. Medicare Learning Network. ADVANCED PRACTICE REGISTERED NURSES, AN ASSISTANTS, AND PHYSICIAN ASSISTANTS. https://www.cms.gov/Outreach-and-Education/Medicare-Learning-Network-MLN/MLNProducts/Downloads/Medicare-Information-for-APRNs-AAs-PAs-Booklet-ICN-901623.pdf
  2. L. 99-509 (42 U.S.C. § 1395 l(a)(1)(H)
  3. 77 Fed. Reg. 68892 (November 16, 2013). In. From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov].
  4. ( 42 C.F.R. § 410.69(a) ) Services of a certified registered nurse anesthetist or an AN’s assistant: Basic rule and definitions.
  5. Annual Report to Congress. Physician Payment Review Commission-1991. https://archive.org/stream/annualreporttoco00unit_7/annualreporttoco00unit_7_djvu.txt
  6. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act. 42 U.S. Code § 300gg–5 – Nondiscrimination in health care.
  7. Section 50: Payment for anesthesiology services; Section 140: Qualified nonphysician anesthetist services. In: Physicians/nonphysician practitioners. In: Medicare Claims Processing Manual. Baltimore, MD: Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services; 2017: chap 12. clm104c12.pdf. https://www.cms.gov/Regulations-and-Guidance/Guidance/Manuals/Downloads/clm104c12.pdf, Accessed December 5, 2020
  8. Pub 100-04 CMS Manual System, Medicare Claims Processing, Transmittal 2716. https://www.cms.gov/regulations-and-guidance/guidance/transmittals/downloads/r2716cp.pdf
  9. Byrd JR, Merrick SK, Stead SW. Billing for Anesthesia Services and the QZ Modifier: A Lurking Problem. ASA Monitor. 2011;75(6):36-38. https://pubs.asahq.org/monitor/article-abstract/75/6/36/4781/Billing-for-Anesthesia-Services-and-the-QZ?redirectedFrom=fulltext. Accessed December 4, 2020
  10. Sinclair DR, Lubarsky DA, Vigoda MM, et al. A matrix model for valuing anesthesia service with the resource-based relative value system. J Multidiscip Healthc. 2014;7:449-458.
  11. McCormack LA, Burge RT. Diffusion of Medicare’s RBRVS and related physician payment policies. Health Care Financ Rev. 1994;16(2):159-173.
  12. Dulisse B, Cromwell J. No harm found when nurse anesthetists work without supervision by physicians. Health Aff (Millwood). 2010;29(8):1469-1475.
  13. Li G, Warner M, Lang BH, Huang L, Sun LS. Epidemiology of anesthesia-related mortality in the United States, 1999-2005. 2009;110(4):759-765.
  14. Needleman J, Minnick AF. Anesthesia provider model, hospital resources, and maternal outcomes. Health Serv Res. 2009;44(2 Pt 1):464-482.
  15. Negrusa B, Hogan PF, Warner JT, Schroeder CH, Pang B. Scope of Practice Laws and Anesthesia Complications: No Measurable Impact of Certified Registered Nurse Anesthetist Expanded Scope of Practice on Anesthesia-related Complications. Med Care. 2016;54(10):913-920.
  16. Pine M, Holt KD, Lou YB. Surgical mortality and type of anesthesia provider. AANA J. 2003;71(2):109-116.
  17. Simonson DC, Ahern MM, Hendryx MS. Anesthesia staffing and anesthetic complications during cesarean delivery: a retrospective analysis. Nurs Res. 2007;56(1):9-17.
  18. The Lewin Group prepared for the American Association of Nurse Anesthetists. Update of Cost Effectiveness of Anesthesia Providers: Final Report Falls Church, VA: Lewin Group IncMay 2016. http://www.lewin.com/content/dam/Lewin/Resources/AANA-CEA-May2016.pdf. Accessed December 6, 2020
  19. Hogan PF, Seifert RF, Moore CS, Simonson BE. Cost-effectiveness analysis of anesthesia providers. Nurs Econ. 2010;28(3):159-169.
  20. Quintana JF, Jones, T., & Baker, K. Efficient Utilization of Anesthesia Practice Models: A Cost-Identification Analysis. In:2009.
  21. Quintana J. Answering Today’s Need for High-Quality Anesthesia Care at a Lower Cost: Remaining States Need to Consider Opting out of Physician Supervision for CRNAs. Becker’s Hospital Review. 
  22. O’Neill NA. Anesthesia Policies- Increasing Costs with No Improvement in Value.J Healthc Commun 2:66. 
  23. Cromwell J, Rosenbach ML. Reforming anesthesia payment under Medicare. Health Aff (Millwood). 1988;7(4):5-19.
  24. Mills A, Sorensen A, Gillen E, et al. Quality, Costs, and Policy: Factors Influencing Choice of Anesthesia Staffing Models. J Healthc Manag. 2020;65(1):45-60.

Methodology for calculating the Qualifying Payment Amount under the No Surprises Act sets up an environment “ripe for discrimination” against CRNAs.

By Jean Covillo, DNAP, CRNA, APRN

Managing Member, Excel Anesthesia, LLC

As published in the federal register,  commercial payers are given the “green light” to discriminate against CRNAs by reducing payments for the same service.

When calculating the Qualifying Payment Amount (QPA), insurance companies are allowed to separately calculate this amount based on service code-modifier combinations- in other words, by provider “type.” There are separate QPAs recognized for each anesthesia delivery model since the QPA is calculated by taking the median allowable amount by “service code-modifier combination.”   Service codes serve to define the delivery model. The QPA for nonmedically directed CRNAs will be calculated by the median specific to claims submitted under the QZ modifier code. Other anesthesia delivery model types such as medical direction or supervision will also have separately calculated QPAs specific to their service codes.

The federal rule states services administered by “similar providers” qualified to bill for the same service would be treated without prejudice with the caveat that market conditions may alter the amount negotiated.  On the surface, this seems reasonable; however, when you drill down to the “methodology” used in the QPA calculation, you see that the separate buckets defining the same anesthesia services set up conditions ripe for discrimination.

The 2019 QZ commercial reimbursement survey showed a 24% disparity in commercial rates when the same services were billed under QZ. (See the video presentation on CRNA Commercial Reimbursement when billing under the Unique QZ modifier: https://youtu.be/XuMZg1PEHV0) It is, therefore, reasonable to assume discrimination is at play when the QPA amount for CRNAs is considerably less than physician-led practices even though both providers are billing for the exact same procedures and essentially the same services.

There is no reason to separately calculate the QPA for the median anesthesia rate per unit by service code-modifier combinations. CMS recognizes both CRNAs and Anesthesiologists as qualified to perform and bill for essentially the same services, and both providers receive the same reimbursement. The nondiscrimination provision of the ACA prohibits payers from discriminating against providers with disparate rates when both are qualified to perform the same services. As published in the federal register, the language gives commercial payers the “green light” to discriminate against CRNAs by offering lower rates “by provider types” when providing the same service.

Service codes that offer the same billable service should not have separate QPAs. The QZ study performed for services in 2019 shows a 24% disparity between CRNAs and Anesthesiologists, and most practice settings are affected by these policies. QZ is responsible for a third of all anesthesia claims submitted, and most practices, including physician-led practices, are billing nonmedically directed QZ services when medical direction criteria fail. All practice settings are affected by this type of discrimination.

Federal Register:..to calculate the QPA for anesthesia services furnished during 2022, these interim final rules require the plan or issuer to, first, take the median contracted rate for the anesthesia conversion factor (determined in accordance with the methodology for calculating median contracted rates for service code-modifier combinations) for the same or similar item or service as of January 31, 2019, and increase that amount to account for changes in the CPI-U, using the methodology described earlier in this section of the preamble.

Interim Final Rule text:

https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2021/07/13/2021-14379/requirements-related-to-surprise-billing-part-i#p-220

 

 

 

 

 

Research Studies

An Evaluation of Commercial Payer Reimbursement and Contracting Factors for Physician Anesthesiologists and Certified Registered Nurse Anesthetists for Services Performed in 2019

 

CRNA FEE for Service Posted Content

 

Survey Instructions and Survey Questions

Help us end the Pandemic! Get Vaccinated!

Opinion By Dr. Jean Covillo, CRNA

When our choices as individuals overwhelmingly threaten the health and prosperity of our society ~ one must question whether these choices, are indeed, truly “personal.”

Every day I see, hear, and read about folks angrily defending their rights as U.S. citizens to make their own decisions, live their own way, and any number of other complaints that apply to any one of their constitutional “rights”.  Although many of these arguments are valid, and worthy of debate, I rarely hear anyone add “personal responsibility” when demanding and defending those “rights”.   Instead, these arguments seem to arise from a sense of personal entitlement without consideration of responsibility that accompanies these “rights.”

There are many arguments being presented as to why folks are refusing vaccinations and to a very small degree, I would agree that some of them are valid.  Vaccination hesitancy is a very real issue for many and we need to do a better job of educating folks, dispelling all the ugly myths, and encouraging folks to get vaccinated.   But the argument that I most want to address is the one where people use “personal rights” as a valid excuse for their decision to refuse, saying things like “it is my body, and I have the right to refuse to get this.”  “I will take my chances. My choice only affects me.”  “I am young and I will be fine.”  Those arguments would have merit if, the consequence of this choice only affected the person making it.  But it doesn’t.  The consequences of refusing to get vaccinated impacts everyone. When “personal choices” and “personal rights” affect all of us, it is no longer  considered a “personal choice” or a “personal right.”  What about my rights to seek medical care in a hospital without fear of contracting a more virulent strain of Covid (Delta Variant)?

Several weeks ago, my husband had to go to the ER for a severe bacterial infection that had gotten into his blood.  He was gravely ill and urgently needed to be seen, admitted and receive antibiotics intravenously.  He did not need to be exposed to a bunch of people sick with Covid because they refused to be vaccinated.  COVID infections were overloading the hospitals and the ER when we arrived and we waited hours and hours, while he shivered with fever in a non-reclining chair in an ER that was also overloaded with Covid patients I was concerned for his safety.  We almost weren’t given a bed for an illness so severe, he required a week-long stay, and home antibiotic infusion therapy for six weeks following discharge!  Thankfully he did not contract the Covid virus during his stay.  Refusing the vaccination simply due to “personal choice” places you squarely in the center as the source of the problem and is one of the biggest reasons this country can’t get over this pandemic.  This “personal choice” has a direct impact on  me, my coworkers, my family, and my friends as well as everyone else breathing the same air on this beautiful planet. It prevents our economy from moving forward, leads to more hospitalizations and delays in acute care and elective surgeries.  My  company depends on healthy patients and staff to available to perform elective surgeries.  Choosing not to get vaccinated doesn’t only affect you-it affects ALL of US in EVERY aspect of society!

Historically, laws have been made to protect society from the hazardous effects that sometimes arise through our “personal choices”.  For example, cities along the coast implement mandatory evacuations when hurricanes are imminent.  These laws were passed not only to protect its citizens but to protect emergency personnel from endangering themselves during unnecessary rescue procedures for citizens who refuse to leave.  One might argue, these folks have a right to stay in their homes, but if their decisions threaten the safety of others, is this a “personal right?”  Seat belt laws, speed limits, enforcement of road closures during icy conditions, “No Smoking” in public places, and environmental regulations associated with chemical dumping in our rivers and lakes, are just a few examples of laws passed to protect society from individuals exercising their “personal rights” in a manner that threatens others.  The question we must all ask ourselves when spouting our personal rights is this:  Do personal rights give us the right through our choices to threaten the safety of our fellow man?

The science community has provided overwhelming evidence that shows the Covid vaccinations (Pfizer and Moderna) to be incredibly safe for the individual, highly effective in reducing the severity of a COVID infection and slowing down the spread.  If we can reduce the transmission, we can reduce the virus’ ability to continue to mutate and put an end to its reproduction.  If we refuse to take steps to reduce the transmission, this virus will mutate again which ultimately will result in a variant unresponsive to vaccines on the market-and yes-that affects me too!  Please Trust the Science and the Doctors and Nurses in your community.  Ask them…don’t look for answers by friends on Facebook.  In fact, don’t even look to me.  This is not a political decision.  Listen to your doctor-Get vaccinated- and help us end this nightmare!

People simply must be educated on how the personal choice to refuse the vaccine is simply not one that can be personally made. Everyone who can get vaccinated simply must.  Please encourage your friends to get vaccinated.  If we are unsuccessful in quickly doing this on our own steam voluntarily, then other measures must be implemented to protect the health, safety, and economic prosperity of society from the few unwilling to see beyond themselves.

Missouri Medicaid Expansion-Approved by Voters – Opposed by Legislators

By Jean Covillo, DNAP, MA, CRNA

March 27, 2021

Until Medicaid expansion actually takes effect, non-disabled adults without children are not eligible for Medicaid in Missouri (MO HealthNet) regardless of how low their income is, and parents with dependent children are only eligible with incomes that don’t exceed 22 percent of the poverty level.  Do you know what 22% of the federal poverty level (FPL) is? For those without a calculator handy, I’ll do the math for you: Anyone making less than $2,833.60/year for a single person. Since Missouri only allows households with dependents to qualify, a family of 2 must make less than $3,832.40/ year or $319/Month in order to be eligible for Medicaid.  Only Texas and Alabama have lower Medicaid eligibility caps, at 18 percent.

Republican lawmakers blocked Medicaid expansion funding from reaching the Missouri House floor on Thursday, posing a setback for the voter-approved plan to increase eligibility for the state health care program.The House Budget Committee voted along party lines not to pass a bill allowing Missouri to spend $130 million in state funds and $1.6 billion in federal money to pay for the program’s expansion. Under the Affordable Care Act, the federal government picks up 90% of the tab on expanding Medicaid.  Republicans sited cost as one of the biggest reasons for the obstruction.   Let’s take a closer look at this flawed rationale.

In 2021, the national average unsubsidized premium for a 40-year-old non-smoking individual purchasing coverage through the Marketplace was $436 per month for the lowest-cost silver plan and $328 per month for a bronze plan, which equates to nearly eighty percent of income for those at the lower income range of people in the gap (below 41% FPL) and nearly a third of income for those at the higher income range of people in the gap. My opinion?…Get real!  No one can be expected to use 80% of their paycheck to pay for health insurance regardless of how much money is earned, let alone a salary this low.

Missouri citizens rightly recognized this for what it is: A serious health crisis.  In August of 2020 Missourians did the right thing by joining 38 other states that had voted to approve Medicaid expansion.  The amendment was approved by a margin of 53.2 to 46.7 percent allowing Medicaid to expand eligibility to people between the ages of 19 and 65 as long as their income is at or below 138 percent of the federal poverty level. In other words Medicaid  in Missouri will now include single folks making less than $17,774.40 and families of 4 making less than $36,570.  The expansion was estimated to cover  230,000 Missouri individuals and has a July 1 deadline for implementation.  Sounds great right? Well …not quite. Although the amendment was approved by a majority of the voters, legislators are now refusing to fund the Program-effectively saying the voters don’t know what’s best.  Without passing a bill that outlines funding, the plan cannot be expanded.

Missouri’s history of missing out on billions in federal funding

In states that expand Medicaid, the federal government paid the full cost of expansion through 2016. Starting in 2017, the states gradually started to pay a share of the expansion cost, but the states’ portion according to federal statute, would never be more than 10 percent. Because of the generous federal funding for Medicaid expansion, states like Missouri that rejected it missed out on billions of federal dollars that would otherwise have been available to provide healthcare in the state.  And they are continuing to miss out on added revenues. A University of Missouri School of Medicine study in 2012 concluded that Medicaid expansion would be highly beneficial to the Missouri economy and its citizens by increasing jobs, increasing tax revenue from newly employed citizens, and increased gross state product (GSP).  These increases in state revenues over the 2014-2020 years were estimated to net  1 billion dollars  in revenues over expense. But Missouri legislators apparently didn’t read the report.  Consequently, in June 2014, the Missouri Economic Research and Information Center announced that healthcare job growth in Missouri had slowed considerably since 2012, and was falling behind compared with states that had expanded Medicaid. Healthcare is the state’s largest employment sector.

From 2013 through 2022, Missouri was projected to give up $17.8 billion in federal funding by not expanding Medicaid. That number will end up being a little lower, however, since Medicaid expansion is or was expected to take effect at some point in 2021. Apparently now, it is not up to the voters and instead is in the capable hands of Mo legislators who think they know best. 

Urban and suburban voters in Missouri largely approved the Medicaid expansion, as did nearly a third of the rural voters. Without the roughly 102,000 rural voters who supported the amendment in August 2020, the Amendment would have failed.  However, Republican state Representative Sara Walsh cited the amendment’s low support among rural voters as a reason to oppose its funding.  State Representative Ed Lewis said that opposing the bill also makes sense considering that the 53.2 percent of voters who approved the expansion don’t amount to a majority of either the state’s eligible voters or its population.  If that’s the argument why would these same votes be considered a majority for winning legislative candidates? I don’t follow the logic..do you?

What happens if  Missouri legislators refuse to fund the Program?

Missouri’s Medicaid program does not currently cover most adults without children. Only the disabled, children and parents with incomes under 18% of federal poverty level — less than $5,800 a year for a family of four — are eligible. It is one of the lowest eligibility thresholds in the nation. The expansion will allow adults earning up to 138% of the federal poverty level to be covered. This expands eligibility to those families of 4 to $36,570.00.

Hospitals in Missouri that treat uninsured patients have been especially hard-hit, as their federal disproportionate share hospital funding has started to be phased out (it was supposed to be replaced by Medicaid funding) and the uninsured rate has remained higher than it would have been with Medicaid expansion in place. As a result of Missouri’s decision to opt out of Medicaid expansion, hospitals in the state were projected to lose $6.8 billion between 2013 and 2022. Refusal to fund the program will force more rural hospitals to close.

The August 2020 vote was a citizen mandate in which many Republican citizens supported. Republicans enjoyed the overwhelming majority of the elected candidates which is a clear indication these voters supported the expansion amendment. As such, these Republican constituents will view their winning  legislators’ opposition to the expansion as a betrayal of their vote. The COVID-19 relief bill recently signed into law contains $1.1 billion in funding specifically allocated towards expanding Medicaid. The federal funds could also help the state’s rural hospitals and healthcare industry.

What is the real reason for legislator opposition?

Although Republicans have cited the cost, many have long resisted expanding Medicaid in Missouri, likely due to the corresponding federal requirements to provide women’s health care resources such as contraception as a condition of federal funding.  Across the capitol this week, a conservative effort to block Medicaid from paying for certain contraceptives has stalled approval of annual funding for the entire program. Late Tuesday night, Sen. Paul Wieland, Republican, amended a routine hospital tax bill that helps pay for Medicaid by inserting a provision that prohibits the program from covering “Any drug or device approved by the federal Food and Drug Administration that may cause the destruction of, or prevent the implantation of, an unborn child.” Some oral or implanted contraceptives could fit that description. Federal regulations require all insurance to cover contraceptives, with religious exemptions. A separate rule requires Medicaid programs to cover family planning services but does not explicitly spell out contraceptives. Missouri law already prohibits Medicaid coverage of abortion except in cases where the mother’s life is at risk. 

In Missouri, Gov. Mike Parson opposed the expansion but said he would move forward with implementation after passage of the ballot question last year. It is difficult to see how he will manage that when Budget Chair, Cody Smith, Republican has been busy separating money from Parson’s proposed $34 billion state budget, signaling his intent to obstruct Medicaid funding efforts. Smith has also cut $245 million of general revenue spending from Parson’s proposed budget, including some money for new mental health centers. In the latest failed Medicaid funding bill attempt, nine Democrats voted for funding and 20 Republicans, including Smith, voted against. Missouri Secretary of State Jay Ashcroft commended Smith and committee vice chair Dirk Deaton, Republican on a Twitter post, for their “commitment to fiscal responsibility.” According to KC Star reporting, Deaton stated the following in defense of his opposition, “It is to give free health care, government health care to able-bodied adults who can do for themselves.” I would like to know who he is appealing to with this ridiculous argument: It’s certainly not the Republicans who voted for Medicaid expansion back in August of 2020. 

My two cents-(for what it’s worth)

Although Medicaid expansion has been approved by Missouri voters, and Governor Parsons has expressed he would implement it-it won’t move forward without passing a bill designed to fund the program and Republicans are refusing to do it.  The majority of the funding is available now through the COVID Relief bill and state budgetary allocations-if you can pry it away from Budget Chair, Rep. Cody Smith. Funding Medicaid expansion is critical for Missourians. Missourians expressed their approval when the amendment passed with Republican and Democratic support. Missouri state legislators were elected by these people and can just as easily be removed through the same process.  I wonder if Representatives Sarah Walsh, Ed Lewis, Cody Smith, and Dirk Deaton will consider that the 53.2 percent of voters who could vote them out in the next election, will then amount to a majority of  the state’s eligible voters or its population? We’ll have to wait and see.  In the meantime, you can click on their name and send them an email if you think it will help.